Wednesday, March 26, 2008

Big dictators get away with murder as AU targets little Comoros

By Madibeng Kgwete: posted on 26 March 2007

Heads of States of the African Union adopted the African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance last year in January at a summit held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Amongst the African leaders present at the summit were Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and his counterparts from Libya (Colonel Muammar AlGhattafi) and Sudan (Omar el Bashir).

The list of undemocratic African rulers is long. Bear in mind the likes of King Mswati of Swaziland, Theodore Nguema of Equatorial Guinea and Paul Biya of Cameroon. Biya, for example, has been in power since 1982. He’s still sitting over there today.

Currently, AU forces are pushing a self-appointed president of the Comoros out of power. Mohamed Bacar, a French-trained former soldier, is said to have stubbornly clung on to power after an illegal election last year, 2007.

When the AU leaders adopted the Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance, they said they were doing so because they were seeking to entrench in Africa “a political culture of change of power based on the holding of regular, free, fair and transparent elections conducted by competent, independent and impartial national electoral bodies.”

It may be too soon to rate African countries’ compliance with the charter, but, judging by the way preparations have been going in Zimbabwe ahead of Saturday’s election, one can say it is business as usual despite the adoption of the charter. Today does not seem any better than yesterday.

The Comoros is a soft target for the AU forces. Other undemocratic leaders know that they will not face similar action even if they defy the AU. Even worse is the fact that the AU forces overthrowing Bacar are supported by undemocratic countries.

Sudan has deployed its forces to join the overthrow of Bacar, but the Sudanese President himself, Omar el-Bashir, not only has the Dafur genocide in his backyard, but he himself also came to power through undemocratic means.

According to various historical sources, el-Bashir came to power in June 1989 through a military coup against the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. The irony is glaring.

The AU, by targeting the Comoros whilst ignoring bigger tyrants, has started to turn the Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance into another useless paper. The undemocratic cycle goes round and round unabated.

If the African political elite are genuinely interested in democracy and good governance on the continent, the AU must treat all states as equal partners and treat undemocratic rulers similarly. The same should apply to the European Union: sanctions against undemocratic African governments must not border on hypocrisy and selective justice.

Thursday, March 13, 2008

The Mystery of Capital

Book Review: The Mystery of Capital – Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else
Author: Hernando de Soto
ISBN: 0-552-99923-7
Reviewed by: Nelson Kgwete

What distinguishes Peruvian author and economist Hernado de Soto from the rest is the intensity of his research and the wealth of experience he boasts.

De Soto puts both qualities to good use in his book, “The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West And Fails Everywhere Else”.

In the groundbreaking book, De Soto explains in detail the pitfalls of Western-style capitalism in developing countries and what needs to be done to change the fortunes of poor countries and former communist nations.

He attributes much of the problems afflicting poor countries to bureaucratic inefficiency, something government officials and those who rely on government services will easily identify with.

In Egypt, for example, the author says his research team has established that: “To build a legal dwelling on former agricultural land would require six to 11 years of bureaucratic wrangling, maybe longer”!

This, according to De Soto, “explains why 4.7 million Egyptians have chosen to build their dwellings illegally.

“If, after building his home, a settler decides he would like to be a law-abiding citizen and purchase the rights to his dwelling, he risks having it demolished, paying a steep fine and serving up to ten years in prison.”

On growing urbanisation and why many developing countries struggle to cope, De Soto says “extralegal ventures [such as illegal occupations of land, unregistered small businesses in the inner cities] have already overtaken government efforts to provide housing for migrants and the poor”.

South Africans will bear testimony to this statement. Just last year during the Limpopo Housing Indaba, commentator after another emphasised the need to prioritise planning instead of occupying land, building and then planning afterwards. Everyone agreed that proper planning is crucial.

To get an idea of how difficult the life of migrants is in cities and other urban environments, De Soto said he and his team decided to open a small garment workshop on the outskirts of Lima, the capital city of Peru, with the aim of creating a new and perfectly legal business.

“The team then began filling out the forms, standing in the queues and making the bus trips into central Lima to get all the certifications required to operate, according to the letter of the law, a small business in Peru,” writes De Soto.

And what did they experience? Well, as the author puts it: “They spent six hours a day at it and finally registered the business – 289 days later.” And, “although the garment workshop was geared to operating with only one worker, the cost of legal registration was $1, 231 – thirty-one times the monthly minimum wage”!

De Soto says many governments in developing countries do not keep credible data of the people and their economic status. In plain terms, De Soto blames governments for not having enough information about the people they are supposed to serve.

To illustrate this, the Peruvian refers to a good example: “In Brazil,” he says, “the construction industry reported a mere 0.1 percent growth in 1995; yet cement sales during the first six months of 1996 soared by nearly 20 percent.”

“The reason for the apparent anomaly, according to a Dutch Morgan Grenfell, was that 60 to 70 percent of the region’s construction never makes it into the records,” writes De Soto in the chapter, The Mystery of Political Awareness.

The author uses numerous examples to show how failure to rapidly legalise small businesses and speed up government processes leads to lawlessness in many developing countries.

De Soto does not condone lawlessness though. Instead, he urges developing countries and former communist nations to stop copying Western laws without due consideration given to unique local realities.

Most South Africans will identify easily with the problems identified by De Soto in his book. If you’re looking for a stimulating read full of new and interesting ideas, De Soto’s groundbreaking offering should come handy.

Monday, March 10, 2008

Brendan Boyle is wrong about Mbeki

The writer fails to support his arguments with convincing facts

By Madibeng Kgwete: posted on 10 March 2008

There are various half-truths in Brendan Boyle’s article, “Civil society must seize the moment to recreate debate” (Sunday Times, 09 March), but I’d like to draw his attention to only two of those.

Firstly, Boyle says, amongst other things, that: “The Native Club used its own uncertain definitions to ensure that only those who held similar views to Mbeki would be admitted to that influential talk shop.”

If it is true that the Native Club admits people with similar views to those of Mbeki, maybe Boyle would explain how known critics of Mbeki, such as Prof. Sipho Seepe, got admitted to the club.

Having attended almost all meetings of the Native Club last year, I know it as a matter of fact that not only are critics of the President welcome at the club; even non-blacks are invited to take part.

In one of the debates focussing on name-changes in the country, Kalie Kriel, spokesperson of the Afrikaner group, Afri Forum, was invited as a panellist. He came with several whites.

At the end of the debate, Native Club member Ngila Muendane invited Kriel to join the club in an effort to encourage a culture of debate in the country, especially amongst members of different racial groups.

Not surprisingly, Kriel turned away the invitation, not because he was inadmissible on the basis of his differences with Mbeki’s government or because of his skin complexion, but because he chose not to associate himself with the club.

Secondly, Boyle uses the controversy surrounding the re-launch of the Forum for Black Journalists (FBJ) as an example to illustrate how Mbeki’s legacy as ANC president is tainted by “intellectual tyranny”, which, in simple terms, means stifled debate.

Interestingly, the said FBJ controversy involved new ANC president Jacob Zuma, who delivered an exclusive address to the forum’s controversial meeting, where white journalists were barred and sympathetic black colleagues labelled coconuts.

Boyle thus fails to support his arguments with convincing facts. And that’s typical South African journalism/political analysis: no research and, consequently, poor arguments supported by half-truths. The readers deserve better.